Security of complex systems is an important issue in software engineering. For complex computer systems involving many actors, security protocols are often used for the communication of sensitive data. Actor key compromise (AKC) denotes a situation where the long-term secret key of an actor may be known to an adversary for some reasons. Many protocols are not secure enough for ensuring security in such a situation. In this paper, we further study this problem by looking at potential types of attacks, defining their formal properties and providing solutions to enhance the level of security.
Introduction
Security of complex systems is an important issue in software engineering. For complex computer systems involving many actors, security protocols are often used for the communication of sensitive data. However, security protocols are not always secure enough, because of reasons including that there may be weakness in the methods for generation of secrete keys, storage of keys and so on. If an actor's key is revealed and used by an adversary to impersonate another party communicating with the actor, then there is a key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack [1] , and then the attacker may obtain sensitive data through such an impersonation. Actor key compromise (AKC) attack is a generalization of this kind of attacks. This has been studied in [2] , where this property is formalized and conditions under which it can and cannot be achieved are identified.
Previous works focus on KCI attacks in the domain of key establishment protocols. In [3] and [4] some concrete two-party protocols have been studied and countermeasures to prevent such attacks provided. The type of KCI attacks is classified in [5] and [6] based on whether the responder authenticates the initiator, and use digital signatures and timestamps as a help. [7] is the first to study security attribute of group key exchange protocols under KCI attack. The first computation model of KCI is provided in [9] . Then [2] provides a systematic analysis of the consequences of compromising the actor's secret key and countermeasures, and shows both constructive and impossibility results.
There are additional issues that need to be investigated. Firstly, the classification of KCI attacks based on adversary's capability of eavesdropping and sending messages is generic and may not reveal the particular feature of such attacks. Furthermore, providing definitions of attack types may make it easier to analyze the vulnerabilities and then modify the protocol for enhancing security. Second, the work in [2] focuses on the problem where a given actor may have the secret key being compromised, and we focus on solutions for enhancing the security in case one of the actors (however, which one is unknown) has the secret key being compromised, and we also consider multi-party protocols and a different type of security claims. Third, no practical algorithms have been provided in transforming a protocol into an AKC resilience one, which is also important for the practical use of the methods.
The purpose of this work is to provide practical solutions for transforming protocols to achieve higher security levels against AKC attacks. The work includes classifying types of AKC attacks and providing their formal definitions, furnishing solutions, and providing practical algorithms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the modeling framework and gives formalization of security properties. In Section 3, we classify four types of AKC attacks and give formal definition of the attacks. In Section 4, we propose solutions to prevent such attacks. We present case studies in section 5 and concluding remarks in Section 6.
The proofs of the propositions and corollaries, and the algorithms for the transformation of protocols are to be found in the appendix.
RunEvent describes how agents start threads, send and receive messages. LKR(a) is an event where the adversary compromises a's long term secret key. The AdvEvent is executed in the single adversary thread tid A .
As an example, the event
denotes that Alice sends Bob a nonce n #tid in the run tid and encrypted with its secret key.
An event e has an event-type and a label which are denoted evtype(e) and label(e), and the contents of a send-event e is denoted cont(e).
In order to simplify the typing constraint, in the following, e, e stand for events, ρ, ρ stand for sequence of events, r, r stand for roles, a, b stand for agents, l, l stand for labels, t, t stand for role terms and run terms (should be clear from the context), m, n stand for run terms that are used in a message, tid, tid 1 , tid 2 for TID. Let X be a set. A sequence y of elements of X is denoted y ∈ X * . An element a in a sequence y is denoted a ∈ y. The operation · denotes the concatenation of two sequences. The powerset of X is denoted pow(X).
A sequence of RoleEvent is well-formed, if all variables initialized in an accessible position in a recv event are not used before that event. Let vars(X) denote the set of variables appearing in X. wellf ormed(ρ) ⇔ ∀ρ , l, a, b, t, ρ , v :
A protocol is a partial function from R to Event * together with a function that formalizes which terms may be stored in a given variable. For each role, the sequence of events must be wellformed. Definition 3 (Protocol): Let Π : R → Event * and type Π : V ar → pow(RunT erm). If for all r ∈ dom(Π), Π(r) is wellformed, then (Π, type Π ) is a protocol.
For convenience, we extend the domain of type Π to Run-Term such that type Π (t) for a run term t is the set of run terms such that variables in t is substituted according to the initial type Π .
In a protocol, a label l is associated with a send-role and a receive-role, denoted respectively sl(l) and rl(l), defined by sl(l) = r, if label(e) = l and, e = send l (r, r , t) ∈ Π(r) or e = recv l (r, r , t) ∈ Π(r ) for some t; rl(l) = r , if label(e) = l and, e = send l (r, r , t) ∈ Π(r) or e = recv l (r, r , t) ∈ Π(r ).
Execution Model
Protocol execution is modeled as a labeled transition system (State, RunEvent, →, s 0 ). A state s = (tr s , AK s , th s , σ s ) consists of a trace tr s ∈ (T ID×(RunEvent ∪ AdvEvent)), the adversary's knowledge AK s , a partial function th s ∈ T ID → RunEvent * and a role and variable instantiation σ s ∈ Inst. We denote σ s (tid) as σ s,tid , and tr s (i) as tr s,i which is the i-th event of the trace. The initial state s 0 is
The operational semantics of a protocol is defined by a transition system which are composed of execution rules from The create rule starts a new thread of a protocol role R. The send rule sends a message m to the network and add it to adversary knowledge. The receive rule accepts message if it match the pattern pt. The claim rule states a security property that is expected to hold. The LKR actor rule allows the adversary to learn the long-term keys of the agent executing the test run.
Let the protocol (Π, type Π ) with an initial role R ∈ dom(Π), and a set of adversary rules A be given. If there is a rule such that s → s , then we write s → Π,typeΠ,R,A s . The set of reachable states denoted RS(Π, type Π , R, A) is {s | s 0 → * Π,typeΠ,R,A s}. The set of all possible traces of the protocol (Π, type Π ) is denoted T races(Π, type Π ).
In a state s, we have a trace tr s and each thread in the trace is created by a role. The special thread T est is created by R. Let role s : T ID → R be a function that identifies a tid with a role in s. Then role s (T est) = R and role s (tid) = r , if (tid, create(r , σ s (r ))) ∈ tr s .
Security Property
Security properties are modeled as reachability properties. A secrecy claim on a role term t is of the form claim l (r, secret, t) for some label l and role r. Definition 4 (secrecy claim): Let s be a state. If γ = claim l (r, secret, t) is a secrecy claim on t, and (T est, σ s,T est (γ #T est )) ∈ tr s , then
The following two properties are related to data agreement. The commit property means that the initiator agree on some data with the responder. The nisynch property means whenever initiator I completes a run of the protocol with responder R, then R has previously been running the protocol with I, and the two agents agreed on all the variables. A commit claim on a role term t is of the form claim l (r, commit, r , t) for some label l and roles r and r . A corresponding running claim for such a commit claim is of the form claim l (r , running, r, t). Definition 5 (commit claim): Let s be a state. If γ = claim l (r, commit, r , t) is a commit claim, and (T est, σ s,T est (γ #T est )) ∈ tr s , then s |= γ, iff • there is a tid such that role s (tid) = r , and • there is a running claim δ = claim l (r , running, r, t) such that (tid, σ s,T est (δ)) ∈ tr s , and there exists a sendevent e, such that (tid, e) ∈ tr s , t acc cont(e). Let < R denote the total order of events in a sequence (for the sequence of events ε 1 , ε 2 , ε 3 , we have ε 1 < r ε 2 , ε 2 < r ε 3 , and ε 1 < r ε 3 ). The order on events which is induced by the communications is defined as ε 1 ε 2 ⇔ ∃l, r, r , t 1 , t 2 : ε 1 = send l (r, r , t 1 ) ∧ ε 2 = recv l (r, r , t 2 ). The transitive closure of the union of the role event order and the communication relation is called the protocol order ≺ P = ( ∪ r∈R < r ) + . prec(cl) is the set of causally preceding communications of a claim event labeled with cl:
Let tidinst s : R → pow(T ID) denote the function that maps roles to runs according to tr s of the state s. Let ev(tr s,i ) denote e iff tr s,i = (tid, e) for some tid.
A nisynch claim is of the form claim l (r, nisynch) for some r and l for stating the correspondence between sendmessages and recv-messages. Definition 6 (nisynch claim): Let s be a state. If γ = claim l (r, nisynch) is a nisynch claim, and (T est, σ s,T est (γ #T est )) = tr s,k for some k, then s |= γ ⇔∀l ∈ prec(l), a, b, m, ∀j < k, tid ∈ tidinst s (rl(l )) :
(ev(tr s,j ) = recv l (a, b, m) #tid ⇒ ∃i < j, tid ∈ tidinst s (sr(l )) :
A protocol is AKC secure if its security claim holds under AKC attacks. This property has been formalised in [2] . Here we use (Π, type Π ) |= A γ to denote that for all s ∈ RS(Π, type Π , R, A), s |= γ. Definition 7 (Actor key compromise security, AKCS): Let (Π, type Π ) be a protocol, R ∈ dom(Π), A an adversary (represented by a set of adversary rules) such that LKR actorΠ,R ∈ A, and γ ∈ Π(R) a security claim. γ is
For the correctness of security properties, we assume that no asymmetric long-term secret keys appear in accessible positions in any messages of a protocol, in the subsequent sections.
R∈dom(Π) tid ∈(dom(th))∪{tid A ,T est} σ :R→A (tr,AK,th,σ)→(tr· (tid,create(R,σ(R))) ,AK,th Fig.2 . Adversary-compromise rules
Attack Types
Understanding adversary's techniques to launch attacks and their attack objectives is helpful in identifying weakness of protocols. Some work has been done on categorizing attacks with traditional Dolev-Yao adversary model. In [12] , there is a classification of known-key attacks, where they study AK protocols and categorize attacks based on adversary's capability of modifying messages. In [13] one-pass two-party key establishment protocols under KCI attacks are studied, two classes of KCI attacks are described. Here we study types of attacks under stronger adversary models. Furthermore, we provide the formal definition of such attacks based on the trace model and techniques for fixing such protocols are provided in the next section. Secrecy Attack One purpose of a protocol is to transmit a secret nonce from an initiator to a responder. In order to keep the nonce secret, The initiator will encrypt the nonce with the responder's public key, which is not safe if intruders knows the responder's secret keys. Definition 8 (Secrecy attack):
, then there is secrecy attack on t, which we denote SecrecyAttack(t, Π, type Π ). Example Suppose that the initiator wants to transmit a secret nonce to the responder before setting up a session key. In order to keep the nonce secret, the initiator will encrypt the nonce with the responder's public key, which is not safe if intruders knows the responder's secret keys. Consider the CCIT-ban1[19] protocol as follows.
Clearly, there is secrecy attack on Ya, if the secret key of the responder is known to the intruder. Substitution Attack An attack of this type occurs in a situation when an initiator and a responder try to use fresh values or secret keys to authenticate each other. The main characteristics of this type of attacks is that the adversary replaces terms in a message with another terms without being discovered.
Let M atch s (a, tid 1 , b, tid 2 ) denote that the thread tid 1 instantiated by the agent a is the corresponding thread communicating with tid 2 instantiated by b according to σ s of the state s. In other words, M atch s (a, tid 1 , b, tid 2 ) iff there is r, r such that σ s,tidi (r) = a and σ s,tidi (r ) = b for i = 1, 2.
Let m[x/y] denote m derived from m by replacing y in m with x. Let L be a subset of labels, S and S be sets of terms, and ≺ be an access relation. The predicate Replace is defined as follows.
In a substitution attack, the adversary eavesdrop the message and modify some of its fresh values by its own fresh values and transmit it to the receiver of the message.
Let F inish(s, tid) denote the thread tid has been completed in s, i.e., every event in the sequence th s (tid) has a corresponding event in tr s .
where AdvF resh denote the subset of F resh used by the adversary. Definition 9 (Substitution Attack): For a security protocol (Π, type Π ), there is a substitution attack, if ∃s ∈ RS(Π, type Π , R, A) and a tid such that F inish(s, tid) and Replace(s, Label, S, S , acc , tid) hold, which we denote SubAttack(Π, type Π ). Example Consider the Bilateral Key Exchange (BKE) protocol as an example, which is supposed to guarantee the secrecy of kir and agreement on nr and ni.
The protocol is vulnerable to substitution attacks. If the intruder (denoted D Alice ) knows the secret key of Bob (an agent of the role R), he can decrypt message 2 using the secret key, and constructing another message 2' using its own nonces. In this way, the adversary impersonate Bob to Alice (an agent of I) and break agreement of ni and nr between them:
3. D Alice decrypts message using sk(Alice) and learns hash(ni) 4. D Alice chooses nr , kir and constructs {hash(ni), nr , Alice, kir } pk(Alice) 5. D Alice → Alice : {hash(ni), nr , Alice, kir } pk(Alice)
Role-mixup Attack An attack of this type has the result that the participating entities do not agree on who is playing what role in the protocol. We use T ermin(s, L) to denote that there exists some label l ∈ L which contains role name in accessible position and there is no matching send-events for a recv-event in the trace. The role-mixup attack states that the messages which has agent names in accessible position have been replaced by the adversary, or the public(secret) key of some agent may be replace by other agent's public(secret) key, or the adversary forged a message with agent names in accessible position to impersonate another party. The protocol is vulnerable to role-mixup attacks. In this protocol Bob and Alice want to agree on fresh values RA, RB, T ext3 and T ext5. The attack is shown in Fig 3, in which the adversary listens to the message between them and impersonate Alice and Bob, such that Alice assumes Bob as B and Bob assumes Alice as B, however both Alice and Bob are acting as A. Parallel Attack In the environment that the same protocol has run as several threads, the authentication may not be preserved because A may communicate with B in the first thread, and with C which has run the same protocol later, but A still assumes he is communicating with B. Definition 11 (Parallel Attack): Let (Π, type Π ) be a protocol. The parallel attack of (Π, type Π ), denoted P arallelAttack(Π, type Π ), is defined as follows.
Example Consider the following protocol, in which the two agents authenticate each other using three nonces. The protocol is vulnerable to parallel attack when Alice has two runs of the protocol. The adversary can forge the message in the second run, which makes Bob initiate a session with Alice in run 1 but receive the last authentication message in run 2. We show the attack in Fig 4. 
Preventing Attacks
In this section, we give constructive methods for avoiding potential AKC attacks. In [2] , transformations to achieve unilateral security is provided. Our work tries to provide transformations that achieve bilateral secrecy and agreement, and instead of using secret keys to achieve agreement, we use hash function and public keys to achieve agreement. The argument here is that the content encrypted by public keys will not be compromised easily, and we can use hash function to commit values to be used as short term keys. Another particular point of our work is to use a special tag including role names to prevent role-mixup attack. Furthermore, we modify the nparty NSL protocol in order to achieve the higher agreement property nisynch, which illustrates the practicability of the approach.
Resilience of Secrecy Attack
In [2] , a tagging function for the transformation is provided. We recall that the function τ c and the restricted one τ c|S defined as follows . Definition 12 (Tagging function) Let c ∈ Const, τ c :
T erm → T erm, then for all t, t 1 , ..., t n ∈ T erm :
if t atomic or long-term key,
τ c|S denotes the modification of τ c which restricts the domain of τ c to some set S of terms to avoid tagging unnecessary terms.
The transformation in Fig 5 shows how to ensure AKCS of secrecy. Three messages are added: the first one is a constant asking for a nonce, the second one contains an encrypted nonce, and the third one contains the secrecy encrypted by the nonce and the public key together. The last two works like encrypting secrecy with two pair of keys, which the adversary at most compromise either pair of them, thus achieving AKCS of secrecy for both sides. Here we add different constant tags on message to ensure the secrecy.
Let type T S(Π) = type Π , M = {k, c 2 } pk(R) , N = {{m, c 3 } k } pk(R ) , and The formal definition of the transformation is as follows.
Since no asymmetric long-term secret keys appear in accessible position in a sent-message (a requirement stated at the end of Section 2), and it can be proved [2] that the adversary can not reveal or infer the peers' asymmetric long-term secret key, except the one the adversary knows through the given adversary rule. The proof of the following proposition uses the fact that adversary cannot forge the last message, therefore m only appears in accessible position of {m, c 3 } k . The secrecy of m depends on secrecy of k and pk(R ), which cannot be compromised at the same time. The reader is referred to the appendix for details. Proposition 1 (Secrecy by asymmetric encryption): Let R, R ∈ dom(Π) where R = R . Let A, A an adversary which can compromise R and R long-term secret key respectively. c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , Request ∈ Const, l 1 , l 2 , l 3 , l 4 , l 5 ∈ Label and all of them are unequal and unused in Π. Let k, n ∈ F resh, m ∈ RoleT erm such that n acc m and k, n all be unused in Π. If (T S(Π), type T S(Π) ) is a protocol and type T S(Π) = type Π :
Then we can obviously get that (T S(Π), type T S(Π) ) ⇒ ¬SecrecyAttack(m, T S(Π), type T S(Π) ).
4.1.0.1. Remarks. The idea of adding messages to ensure secrecy is similar to that of [2] . The difference is that the purpose here is to ensure bilateral secrecy (i.e., no matter which key is compromised, the secrecy of m is guaranteed).
On Substitution and Parallel Attack
One way to prevent parallel attack is to tag each message with a hash function which includes all the previous variables. If the adversary wants to disorganize one message between different threads, it has to learn all the previous variables from both sides which is very hard. In order to prevent substitution attack, we can also take advantage of hash function by including new fresh and old variables together in one hash function. Then the adversary cannot forge a message using its own fresh because of the use of hash functions. We use this technique in the following transformation function and prove that the commit property can be achieved with AKC attacks.
The transformation in Fig 6 shows how to ensure AKCS of agreement. We assume m ∈ F resh occurs in Π and keeps secret. We add two messages: the first one contains hash function of m and n, where n is not used in the previous events. The second one is a response using hash of n. The hash function here works like a signature, where it takes use of m or n's secrecy to ensure that the adversary can not forge the message. 
The formal definition of the transformation is then as follows.
otherwise.
Proposition 2 (Agreement by hashing):
Let R, R ∈ dom(Π) such that R = R . Let A, A be adversaries which can compromise R and R long-term secret key respectively. Let l 1 , l 2 , l 3 , l 4 ∈ Label and c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ∈ Const all be different and unused in Π, m, n ∈ RoleT erm, and A an adversary such that ∀s ∈ RS(Π, type Π , R, A), AK s σ s,T est (m). If (T A(Π), type T A(Π) ) is a protocol and type T A(Π) = type Π , then
The reader is referred to the appendix for a proof. This kind of transformation is resilient against substitution and parallel attack. Corollary 1 (Resilience of Substitution Attack) If the original protocol is resilient against substitution attack, then the modified protocol keeps this property:
Corollary 2 (Resilience of Parallel Attack) If the original protocol is resilient against parallel attack, then the modified protocol keeps this property:
¬P arallelAttack(Π, type Π )
⇒ ¬P arallelAttack(T A(Π), type T A(Π) )
The two corollaries is used to transform protocol inductively. We can assume a protocol to be empty at first, then add each message based on proposition 2 to ensure agreement. The reader is referred to the appendix for the proofs of the corollaries.
Resilience of Role Mixup Attack
For preventing role-mixup attacks, we find a special kind of tags, which contain all role names encrypted by secret keys, very useful. Let t, t 1 , ..., t n ∈ T erm be terms. Let AR(x) = {dom(Π) \ x} sk(x) , the tagging function υ x (t) is defined as follows.
if t atomic or a long-term key,
Let v x : T erm → T erm extends to Event * → Event * by replacing all terms in the event sequence accordingly. This will then provide a transformation function T R(Π) such that T R(Π)(x) = υ x (Π(x)).
Assume that the content of every message is composite (in contrast to atomic terms) and any send-event has response. Then this transformation is helpful for preventing role-mixup attack. The reason is that, if we consider agent names as fresh values, then based on proposition 11 in [2] , every two parties which communicated with each other agree on all the agent names. Because the communication among parties can form a strongly connected graph, so all parties agree on the agent names. Then if there is role-mixup attack, there exists reachable state s such that either Replace or T ermin function holds. Since each party has agreed on which agent instantiated which role, replacement or forgery can detected by the agents.
In the following, we apply this technique together with the transformations provided in Propositions 1 and 2 to achieve nisynch-property of multi-party protocols. AKCS in Multi-Party Authentication Protocols Multi-party protocols are more vulnerable to AKC attacks as a result of complicated communications among parties. We consider a family of multi-party NSL protocols, which are brought up by [14] . The protocols are vulnerable to AKC attacks. Let the protocols be denoted (Π p , type Πp ) where p denotes the number of parties in the particular protocol.
The approach for the transformation is as follows. We first modify messages between each pair of parties, and add hash function tags in them to prevent substitution and parallel attack. Then we combine the messages between each pair to form a new protocol, and finally add AR(x) tags to prevent role-mixup attack. Let n 0 , ..., n p−1 ∈ F resh, R 0 , ..., R p−1 ∈ R, and
.., n p−1 ), n i+2 , ..., n p−1 } pk(Ri+1) )
Then we define the i'th protocol message, for 0
Here we simplify the tag function ν x (t), because it is sufficient to tag only the first round of communication in one accessible position. Furthermore, we encrypt fresh with secret key in M A to ensure the agreement. Let l 0 , ..., l 2p−1 , m 0 , ..., m p−1 be labels, and S 1 and S 2 be defined as follows.
The modification of a such a protocol (Π p , type Πp ) is as follows (with type Πp keeps unchanged).
This transformed protocol has the same structure as the original one with each message replaced by the given ones. The correctness with respect to the nisynch claim is stated in the following proposition and proved by using the fact that, the message encrypted by asymmetric secret key or contain hash functions on secret nonce can achieve agreement between two parties. The reader is referred to the appendix for a proof. 
Case Studies
Many protocols are vulnerable under AKC attacks, with examples shown in Section 3. We have applied the above techniques to enhance the security level of such protocols. In accordance with the transformation provided in Propositions 1, 2, we transform these protocols into AKCS ones. Table 1 shows part of the results of experiments using the Scyther tool [18] after that we have applied the transformation scheme. '-' means the property is not required for the protocol. For √ we means the property holds for each party in the protocol (after the transformation). 
In the following, we demonstrate how the three practical protocols, PKMV2RSA, Kerberos and Cardholder-Registration protocols, are transformed. We give the original model of these protocols, point out the AKC attack on authorization and secrecy in them and transform the protocol based on the propositions.
PKMV2RSA
PKMV2RSA [15] is a subprotocol of WiMAX, which known as a wireless access system to deliver the "last mile" wireless broadband access. The subprotocols are used for authentication, key management, and secure communication. Among them, PKMV2RSA authenticates the base station (BS) and mobile station (MS) and establishes a shared secret which is used to secure the exchange of traffic encryption keys (TEKs). There are six messages in all, but since the secrecy of TEKs depends on the secrecy of prepak, and the last three messages is resilient against AKC attack, then we only need to look at the first three messages. The protocol proceeds as follows: The secrecy of prepak is based on the secrecy of mobile station's long-term secret key sk(M S). Then there is AKC attack on secrecy of TEKs and agreement of both sides. We implement the protocol by using said to encrypt prepak in message 2, and add hash function on message 3, which is an example of the transformation scheme of Propositions 1 and 2. The modified protocol is as follows. As shown in Table 1 , this modified protocol satisfies the nisynch-property, the claim on the secrecy of prepak holds.
Kerberos
Kerberos [16] is designed to authenticate clients to multiple networked services. PKINIT, an extension of Kerberos 5, is modified to allow public-key authentication. The basic Kerberos has four parties: Client (C), whose goal is to authenticate itself to various application servers; Kerberos Authentication Server (KS), who provide "ticket-granting ticket" (TGT); Ticket-Granting Server (TS), who is presented TGT and then provide "server ticket" (ST) to client. ST is the credential that client uses to authenticate herself to the application server. Since role C talk to KS, TS and S separately, we can divide the protocol to three two-party parts. We show the first part below: The main issue is to ensure secrecy of ST before client sends it to the server, and the secrecy of ST depends on secrecy of AK, which depends on secrecy of k. However, k can be revealed if the intruder knows sk(C) and it is easy for the intruder to fake a message 2 and sent it to KS. Therefore we use Propositions 1 and 2 to modify message 2 as follows.
{{{k} n , H(C, T S, n, {T c, n, C, KS, T S} sk(C) ), C, T GT } sk(KS) } pk(C) , {AK, n, T k, T S} k Then part 1 can achieve both secret and nisynch property. The other two parts can be modified similarly.
Cardholder-Registration
Cardholder-Registration protocol [17] is the first part of SET protocol in online purchase. It comprises three message exchange between the cardholder and a certificate authority. In the first exchange, the cardholder requests registration and is given the certificate authority's public keys. In the second exchange, the cardholder supplies his credit card number (PAN) and receives an application form for the bank that issued his credit card. In the third exchange, the cardholder returns the completed application form and delivers his public signature key and supplies a CardSecret. This process is as follows. The protocol is not secure: the secrecy PAN, NsecC, and NsecCA will be revealed if C or CA's long-term secret key is compromised. It also fails to reach agreement: message 3, 4 or 5, 6 contains no previously received messages, and is thus vulnerable to parallel attacks. We can modify the protocol by inserting a new nonce Nc4 to encrypt PAN and NsecC and adding hash tags in each message to guarantee nisynch property. The modified protocol is as follows. The modification guarantees the secrecy of P AN and the nisynch-property.
Concluding Remarks
This paper gives an analysis of AKC attacks and provides solutions to enhance the level of security. We consider four types of AKC attacks and give the definition of these types. Then based on the attack types, we provide techniques for transformation of protocols. A guiding principle in designing security protocol under potential AKC attacks is using short-term keys to ensure secrecy, hash functions to maintain agreement and role names to prevent role-mixup attack. We have applied the techniques to the transformation of practical protocols and have used the verification tool Scyther to show that the modified protocols have achieved higher level of security.
